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Review Essay
Interest, Ideology and Imagination Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900-1946. By John G. Clark.
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois. 1987. Pp. 511. Reviewed by Joseph P. Tomain*
[Tihe dynamo itself was but an ingenious channel for conveying somewhere the heat latent in a few tons of poor coal
hidden in a dirty engine-house carefully kept out of sight; but
to Adams the dynamo became a symbol of infinity. - Henry
Adams'
INTRODUCTION

Henry Adams contemplated the great dynamo at the Paris
Exposition in 1900. John Clark opens Energy and the Federal
Government,2 his admirable history of early federal energy regulation,3 with a similarly arresting image. Clark describes a 720ton, 5,000 kilowatt generator surrounded by four massive 2,000
kilowatt generators and other assorted turbines and engines whirring, pumping, and steaming. The Palace of Electricity and the
Palace of Machinery at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair stimulated the imagination of American observers just as the Paris
Exposition stimulated Henry Adams' imagination. Speed, light,
convenience, and modernity were the promises of these machines
which created infinite energy from natural resources hidden in
some "dirty engine-house."

* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.

H. ADAMS, The Education of Henry Adams 380 (Massachusetts Historia Society 1918).
2 J. CLARK, Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900-1946
(1987).
, Clark's book is not a history of "energy regulation" as such because that
phrase did not come into vogue until after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. Instead, as
aptly subtitled, the book is about the fossil fuels of oil, coal, and natural gas. Occasionally, Clark uses the phrases energy and fossil fuels interchangeably; however, the
distinction is important. "Fossil fuels" connotes separate treatment of the oil, natural
gas, and coal industries, whereas "energy" connotes an interrelationship among these
and other resources used in energy production. Clark's aspiration is that the federal
government should engage in "energy" regulation. The reality is that the industries are
regulated separately.
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The machines promised not only technological wonders but
economic prosperity and with it happiness. These promises were
not idle. Between 1880 and 1900, value added to the domestic
economy by manufacturing, and capital invested in manufacturing both increased by two and one-half to three times and energy
consumption nearly doubled from 5 quads to 9.6 quads and
doubled again by 1920 to 22 quads. 4 Thus, the transition from
the 19th to the 20th Centuries was marked by dramatic economic
growth in which energy production was integral. This seeming
link between economic growth and energy production satisfied
the grand dreams of the imagination generated by the great
dynamos of the beginning of the century. The underlying theme
of Clark's study is that the country's energy imagination never
transcended the heights it reached in 1904.
Energy and the Federal Government is engagingly written,
thoroughly documented, and an important scholarly contribution
to the history of government regulation.' Clark presents a detailed political history of federal fossil fuel regulation from the
beginning of the 20th Century through the end of World War
II. This period tracks the country's second energy transition
6
from coal to oil and natural gas.
Clark makes three major arguments which I will address in
turn. First, by 1920 the country's energy industries, energy markets, and the government's regulatory responses to perceived
imperfections in those markets and industries were well established. Clark convincingly demonstrates that the federal government had developed, early on, a dominant model of energy
regulation. Second, but less convincingly, he argues that the
federal regulatory model is not firmly grounded in a public
spirited ideology. Third, Clark concludes that federal energy
policy lacks imagination.
4 Clark, supra note 2, at xxi. A "quad"
represents one quadrillion Btus (British
Thermal Units) of energy. By comparison, the country consumes about 76 quads today.
See Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review
1986, Table 3 at 11, DOE/EIA - 0384(87) (May, 1987).
See, e.g., T. MCCAw, Prophets of Regulation (1984); G. MAZuzAN & J.
WALKER, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation 1946-1962 (1995);
S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission:
Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity (1974).
6 The first energy transition generally is considered to be a transition from wood
to coal in the early to mid-19th century. The third transition from fossil fuels to
renewable resources is yet to occur. See generally S. ScHus & B. NETSCHERT, Energy
in the American Economy, 1850-1975: An Economic Study of its History and Prospects
45-143 (1960).
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In the last chapter, he expresses his frustration toward what
he sees as the country's failure to develop a coordinated national
energy plan even while the country was challenged by two world
wars and by a debilitating economic depression. He is further
disturbed by the failure of energy policymakers to identify and
to articulate the "public interest." Clark's frustration is understandable. After all, several significant pieces of energy legislation expressly state that they are to be guided by the public
interest, yet the term is amorphous. 7 Therefore, according to
Clark, the conflict between strong corporate energy interests and
a weak public-spirited ideology, stifled a regulatory imagination
necessary for truly comprehensive energy planning.
In the last section of this Essay, I will refute Clark's conclusion by offering a counter-thesis. Briefly, the United States has
an ideologically-based energy policy.' The policy relies upon
large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive, centralized production and distribution energy firms which exploit a limited
number of natural resources. Although, the market is the primary ordering mechanism for energy industries, government in-

7 Several federal statutes regulating energy interests explicitly state that regulation
is in the "public interest." See, e.g., Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. § 79(a) (1982); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1982); Natural Gas Act,
15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1982). Clark frequently refers to the public interest in the book,
but he does not provide either an extended or an elaborate discussion, primarily because
the concept is so elusive. He tries to capture the definition when he writes at 34-35:
A policy cannot be in the public interest if it condones, directly or indirectly, immoral or unethical behavior. What precisely such behavior consists of is for society to decide, and it is not to be expected that society
will agree on all or even on most points. The supreme test of policy is that
degree to which it achieves equity (sharing), justice (fairness a la John
Rawls), and liberty all in the spirit of the principles enunciated in the
Declaration of Independence. Policies that promote the fair sharing of
burdens and benefits throughout all segments of society and that carry the
nation a step closer to a realization of the Declaration's principles are in
the public interest. It is simple enough to so state such a meaning of the
public interest; more difficulty may be encountered in evaluating fuel or
energy policies against such amorphous criteria. It might also be legitimately asked whether historians should engage in such assessments. I have
no doubts as to the propriety of evaluation if it is done openly and with
due regard to the facts.
Clark has not overcome the difficulty of defining the public interest in substantive terms.
Instead, he relies on the liberal tradition's penchant for establishing a policy-making
process which satisfies criteria of fairness (due process) and equity (equal protection).
See, e.g., A. Cox, The Court and the Constitution 187 (1987).
1 See Tomain, Energy Policy Advice for the Next Administration, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 63 (1989).
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tervenes to correct market failures, duplicate efficiency, and
dilute monopoly power. 9 Federal energy regulation, thus, takes
the form of muted corporatism 0 in which government-industry
interactions are aimed at delivering an adequate and reliable
supply of reasonably priced energy."
I.

A.

INTEREST: CLARK'S HEURISTIC

The Model

Clark employs an interest model of government regulation
which proceeds in three stages.' 2 First, energy industries and
markets are described. Next, the markets are examined to see if
they contain market imperfections. Finally, if a market imperfection is found, then it is corrected by a regulatory tool with
the intent of mimicking the market.
In the initial decades of the 20th Century, 3 energy markets
were structured by:
(a) Seemingly inexhaustible supplies of oil, natural gas, and
coal;
(b) a shift from local to regional and interstate resource production and distribution;
(c) continuous growth in markets and in energy efficiency;
9 CLARK, supra note 2, at 37-43.
10See, e.g., Fusfeld, The Rise of the Corporate State in America, 6 J. ECON.
IssuEs 1 (March, 1972).
1 The variables used in the formulation of this model are described in more detail
infra Section IV.
,2 See generally J. CHUBB, Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of
Energy, chs. 1 and 7 (1983); B. COMMONER, The Politics of Energy (1979); D. DAVIs,
Energy Politics (1982); Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, A Time to Choose:
America's Energy Future (3d ed. 1982); W. ROsENBAUM, Energy, Politics, and Public
Policy (1981); R. VIETOR, Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of BusinessGovernment Relations, ch. 1 (1984).
11Even today, the fossil fuels of oil, natural gas, and coal, together with electricity,
are the building blocks of our energy economy. The United States consumed 76 quads
of energy in 1987. The 76 quads are divided among the following resources: coal (18.00);
natural gas (17.18); oil (32.63); hydropower (3.04); nuclear power (4.92); geothermal
(0.23); and, other (wood, waste, wind, photovoltaic, and solar connected to electric
utilities) (0.02). Energy Information Agency, Annual Energy Review 1987 DOE/EIA0384 (87) (1988) (Table 3 at 11). Production figures are similar although somewhat lower
indicating that the country is a net importer of energy. In 1987, the country produced
64.55 quads of energy divided among the following resources: coal (20.12); natural gas
(16.84); oil (17.59); natural gas liquids (2.23); hydropower (2.61); nuclear power (4.92);
geothermal (0.23); and other (0.02). (Table 2 at 9).

1989-90]

FossIL FUEL POLICIES

(d) increasing industrial concentration; integration, and largescale production; and
(e) transportation bottlenecks in each industry. 4

This description of energy markets generates a pattern of federal
energy regulation which persists to this day.
Federal energy regulations react to market conditions and
mirror the specific industries being regulated. Regulators, neither
then nor now, treat energy industries either coordinately or
comprehensively.
Coal, oil, natural gas, and power were viewed as separate
industries, each with its own problems and each with its own
impact upon society. Policymakers during the first half of the
twentieth century did not treat the industries as a unit, as
energy industries. Although the individuals involved in each of
these industries were cognizant of the web of interrelationships
that bound them together as they impinged on the economy
and on society, governmental authorities treated them discretely, thinking not of national energy needs but of national
needs for coal, for oil, or for natural gas. This pattern persisted
throughout the period encompassed in this study-and beyond
into the 1980's.' 5
For Clark, by regulating the coal, oil, natural gas (and electricity)
industries, separately and by tracking each resource through its
fuel cycle from production and processing through distribution
and marketing, the forest is lost because of the trees.
Establishing a regulatory institution parallel to the regulated
industry has initial appeal. Regulation can proceed more quickly,
which is to say more efficiently, because transaction costs are
lowered. Information is easier and less costly to obtain, digest,
circulate, and act upon. This initial attraction, while not necessarily fatal, ignores a simple fact. The parallel design reproduces
an industry's problems. Public regulation, of this type, replicates
private conflicts. In the oil industry, for example, the conflicts
between major and independent firms, producers and refiners,
and producing and consuming states 6 were replicated in the
regulatory scheme, and policy development and coordination
became difficult and, at times, stymied. Thus, the limits of the
model.
4 CLARK, supra note 2, at 25-26.
,1Id. at 334.
,6Id. at 197-206 and 243-249.

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:115

The energy policy generated by this model is based on a

fundamental assumption, which, once accepted, makes alternatives difficult to appreciate. The primary assumption is a belief
in an energy production-gross national product link.17 Following
this belief is the hope that economies of scale in energy production can still be realized. Simply, as more energy is produced
prices will be stable or relatively lower and GNP will grow.

Implicit in this simple formula is that the General Welfare increases in direct proportion to GNP or Bigger is Better. This

last assumption is untestable absent a consensus definition of
General Welfare although economics afficionados favor bigger
8
material pies.'
Clark has essentially described the New Deal response 9 to
economic problems. While the model is intelligible, 20 it is one
about which he is suspicious. He suggests that the model's
efficiency goals are narrow and unimaginative because regulatory
objectives are generally limited to encouraging production and
growth and to providing economic stability for energy industries
rather than for the economy as a whole. 2' By limiting objectives

,7 Generally, energy analysts agree that there is a direct relationship between energy
production and GNP. A more specific consensus is that there is no "iron law" mandating
a direct one-to-one ratio between GNP and energy use. Rather, it is believed that the
relationship is not static but varies with such variables as composition of GNP, energy
efficiencies, energy mix, and energy prices. More specifically, as industrialized countries
shift from heavy manufacturing to more service oriented economies the ratio between
GNP and energy use widens. See Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the
Harvard Business School, 141-44 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979); S. SCHUtRR, J
DARMSTADTER, H. PERRY, W. RAMSAY & M. RUSSELL, Energy in America's Future: The
Choices Before Us: A Study 84-124 (1979); S. ScHURR & B. NETSCHERT, Energy in the
American Economy 1850-1975: An Economic Study of its History and Prospects, 14490 (1960); Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, The Global
2000 Report to the President of the U.S., Entering the 21st Century: A Report (Vol. I:
The Summary Report 176-76) (1980); The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global
2000, 46-47 and 342 (J. Simon & H. Hahn eds. 1984); Global Insecurity: A Strategy for
Energy and Economic Renewal, 7-12 and 58-137 (D. Yergin & M. Hillenbrand eds.
1982).
" Compare R. POSNER, The Economics of Justice 13-115 (1982) with R. DwoRKIN,
A Matter of Principle, chs. 12 and 13 (1985).
'1 See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981). The New Deal
model has the following characteristics: expertise, centralization, hierarchy, scientific
objectivism, and rationality. See also FRUG, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276 (1984).
Energy Law (1983); J. ToMAIN
'o It is also a model I have used. See J. ToMATN,
& J. HICKEY, Energy Law and Policy (1989).
21 Mark Sagoff offers an alternative set of objectives and justifications for social
regulation, see The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment
(1988).
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to energy production and industrial stability in the name of
efficiency, there is little room for either energy planning or
redistribution of wealth from producers to consumers.
Although I agree with Clark's descriptions of the narrowness
of this model, I do not accept his substitute. He prefers centralized energy planning. Coordination among the several energy
industries will not occur because energy policies are essentially
polycentric. 22 There is a multiplicity of interested actors; the
intensity of their interests varies; energy policy involves both
normative and positive parameters; and, as if things are not
complicated enough, uncertainties abound. No single oil policy
will be unanimously endorsed by the entire oil industry, for
example. Coordination is, therefore, a practical and theoretical
headache, if not an impossibility.
There is no inexorable reason that federal regulation must
reproduce or enhance established energy industries. Nevertheless,
a federal policy that does favor archetype energy firms does exist
and it is formulated within an identifiable ideological framework
which contains a "public interest" dimension.2 3 Policies outside
this framework, such as those that are too centralized or too
diffuse, will not be accepted. That framework will be described
more fully below.
B.

The Data
1. 1900-1920

With the regulatory model in place, Clark's history bears
witness to it. The single most striking thing about Energy and
the Federal Government is that there is nothing new under the
regulatory sun. Virtually all permutations of government intervention were considered by 1920. Centralization, coordination,
pricing, allocation, voluntarism, tariffs, command and control
and cajolery were all tools in the government's bag of regulatory

22See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395
(1978); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, Tragic Choices, 17-28 (1978)(elaboration of complex
problems); M. WESSEL, Science and Conscience, 4-10 (1980)(discussing the same for
socio-scientific disputes); Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and
the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HAXV. L. REV. 489, 494-508 (1981); Weinberg,
Science and Its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, 2 ISSUES IN ScI. AND TECH. 59 (Fall,
1985).
" See infra Section IV.
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tricks. Although the government had these tools in its repertoire
and had considered using them on specific energy industries, the
more interventionist tools were not used or were not used effec24
tively.
During the first two decades of the 20th Century, modern
energy industries, energy markets, and federal energy regulations
took shape. The country experienced the end of a low energy
society and the beginning of a high energy one dependent on
large-scale, capital-intensive, centralized, interstate energy production and distribution. The general intent of federal energy
regulation was to promote production and industrial stability
and, occasionally, smooth out gross social and economic distortions.
Coal was king during the Industrial Revolution and coal
production increased until 1918 at which time it peaked at 678
million tons.2 5 Throughout this period, oil and natural gas markets expanded signaling a transition from coal to the other fossil
fuels. The oil and natural gas markets were expanding for two
notable reasons. First, new end uses such as refined petroleum
products and automobiles increased demand. Second, coal is a
dirty burning fuel and the cleaner alternatives were preferable.
By 1925, oil had almost one-half of the energy market.2 6 The
federal government never abandoned coal during the transition
from the solid to the liquid and gaseous fossil fuels. Instead of
allowing the transition to occur in the market unimpeded, the
government promoted the use of coal intentionally to buoy the
industry.
Structurally, the coal, oil, and natural gas industries have
similarities and differences which affect government regulation.
The basic differences concern the degree of competition within
a specific industry and the demand for the resources. The basic
similarity is that each industry has a transportation bottleneck.
In the oil and natural gas industries, pipelines are the bottleneck
in the fuel cycle, and in the coal industry, railroads are the
bottleneck.
Of the three industries, coal has been and continues to be
the most competitive. The coal industry is divided into the
bituminous and the anthracite industries. Where there were thou-

, CLARK, supra note 2, at 50.
25 Id.
2

Id.

at 9.
at 13.

1989-901

FossnL

FUEL POLICIES

sands of bituminous producers, (5,060 in 1905 and 9,331 in
1923), 7901o of anthracite production was controlled by 13 producers and 11 of these were railroad companies. 27 Coal ownership
by railroads contributes to the bottleneck problem because railroads can either sell or consume coal for their own use depending
on market conditions. Railroad companies control the price of
either transportation or coal when other fuels or other modes
of transportation are in short supply thus affecting the amount
28
of coal that reaches the market.
Oil is the paradigm of big industry. In 1911, Standard Oil
controlled 64% of the market down from 91076 in 1900 due to
the federal government's successful antitrust litigation. 29 Still, in
1919, thirty-two firms controlled 60% of production and, in
1920, the thirty largest oil firms controlled 72% of the country's
refining capacity. 0 Oil was primarily transported through pipelines having market power.
The natural gas industry was less concentrated in these early
years because natural gas was seen as a nuisance by-product of
oil exploration and was wasted rather than exploited. Before the
turn of the century, there were thousands of municipal natural
gas companies for lighting purposes. However, by the end of
the first quarter of the century, natural gas was seen as a
valuable commodity and the transportation network became
dominated by a few interstate pipeline companies. 3
During this formative period, energy markets moved from
local and state to regional and national. Federal intervention
into private energy industries was episodic which allowed interindustry and interfuel competition to develop and later flourish.
Whenever there were serious blips in energy markets, primarily
when production was not flowing smoothly or distribution was
congested, then the government would intervene in an attempt
to smooth out the blip. Pre-war intervention was motivated by
a sense of progressivism colored by antitrust sentiment. The
Hepburn Act which curtailed big oil's control of interstate pipe-

2'Id.

at 6.
The railroad bottleneck problem exists today as some electric utilities must rely
on railroads to transport coal to their generating units. See United States Department
of Justice, Competition in the Coal Industry (1978).
' Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 2 (1911).
'

o CLARK, supra note 2, at 13.

11See Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the
Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REV. 345, 346 (1983).
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lines, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the rise of state public utility commissions
were all aimed at curtailing market power.3 2 Similarly, controls
aimed at loosening the railroads' grip on coal hauling were also
tried. 3 Looking back on this period of consumer protection in
energy markets, the country would not see such consumer activism until the mid-1970's when state public utility commissions
and state legislatures adopted pro-consumer agendas.34
The Great War only slightly shook the country out of its
Golden Age complacency. Clark argues that the war solidified
the position of private energy industries: "For business, the war
in Europe opened great opportunities for profit through an
expanding foreign trade. As many businessmen viewed it, American entrance into the conflict provided no compelling reasons
for a swollen federal economic role." 35 Although the federal
government did establish the United States Fuel Administration
(USFA), which can be called the first energy agency, and gave
the USFA the power to regulate prices, transportation, and
distribution, it did not exercise these powers. The USFA was
administered locally and its principle goal was to mobilize natural resources for the war not to coordinate energy industries.
The largest impediment in the war effort was a coal shortage
caused by a railroad car shortage. In response, Congress passed
the Lever Act 3 6 giving the President the authority to regulate
the price, production, transportation, and allocation of coal.
Such potential intervention into the private energy sector was
unprecedented and was not widely endorsed by the coal industry.
In fear of the specter of widespread government control, two
trade associations, the National Coal Association and the National Retail Merchants' Association, were established and injected themselves into and coopted the administration of the

32 CLARK, supra note 2, at 49.
31 Id.

at 45-46.

34 See P. NAVARRO,

The Dimming of America: The Real Costs of Electric Utility

Regulatory Failure (1985)(poor regulation has contributed to an underinvestment in
electric plant); D. ANDERSON, Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study
in PoliticalEconomy (1981)(describes a pro-consumer shift in public utility commissions
due to changes in the market); W. GORMLEY, The Politics of Public Utility Regulation
(1983); Olson, Statutes ProhibitingCost Recovery for Cancelled Nuclear Power Plants:
Constitutional? Pro-Consumer?, 28 J. URBAN & CONTEmp. L. 345 (1985)(discusses the
long-term and high-cost consequences of pro-consumer legislation).
35 CLARK, supra note 2, at 50.
36The Food and Fuel Control Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 276.

FossIL
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USFA. "Both associations anticipated key roles in the operation
of the USFA and patriotically pledged their support to the
administration. Nonetheless they defined their essential task as
defending their members against unnecessary and foolish federal
intervention."

37

The carrots of patriotism and voluntarism worked poorly,
so the government brought out a regulatory stick in an effort to
unclog rail congestion. 3s The pressing needs of the war pressured
President Wilson to promulgate a Closing Order on January 17,
1918 which prohibited all non-essential manufacturing plants
from burning fuel or using power from January 18 through
January 22 and on each Monday until March 25, 1918. This
experience neatly capsulizes the history of federal coal regulation. The USFA relied on decentralized administration and the
rhetoric of voluntarism and industry-government cooperation,
rather than on the heavy hand of federal intervention. As a
consequence, coal production did not appreciably increase during
the war, pricing policies were a failure, rail carriers moved coal
to the highest bidders first, and coal allocation regulations were
conducted on a zone basis and were not coordinated. 3 9
At the height of World War I, coal was being replaced by
oil and natural gas and the federal government continued to
support the industry. Not surprisingly, federal oil and natural
gas policies followed a pattern similar to coal regulation as these
industries also garnered federal favor.
The Lever Act also gave the USFA power over oil and
natural gas with the exception of price-fixing authority. Overall,
the USFA wanted to avoid waste in production and consumption
and to limit interventionist tools to voluntary cooperation and
appeals to patriotism. The USFA experienced some success on
the waste front pertaining to coal. ° The agency also tried to
attain a better, more efficient consumption of fuels by moving
natural gas to military contractors for the purpose of freeing up
oil for the war thus prefiguring later fuel conversion regulations.

41

37 CLARK,

supra note 2, at 58.

I' at 71-72.
ld.
39Id. at 79.

Id. at 82-83.
41Modern counterparts to this conversion legislation are the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act., Pub. L. No. 93-913 (1974) replaced by the Power
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During World War I, several restrictions on oil and natural
gas were attempted such as fuel-switching, licensing, price and
production controls, and rationing. However, these controls were
not integrated in an overall energy policy and they ended with
the Armistice. Clark believes that it would be wrong simply to
assume that the USFA's lack of regulatory success meant that
energy industries returned to business as usual. Instead, his
analysis is that World War I had a profound effect on future
energy regulation by positioning major energy industries for
years to come. The regulatory experience from 1900-1920 firmly
established industry-government relations. "However, to a degree disturbing to many, the evolving regulatory mechanisms
masked a system in which implementation of fuel control rested
in the hands of individuals with a direct and pecuniary interest
42
in the fuel industries.
The USFA, symbolic of the first decades of federal energy
regulation and not unlike the present Department of Energy, did
not use its full power to coordinate and establish a national
energy plan. Instead, a muted form of corporatism took hold.
Coal successfully kept government out of its industry except to
support it. Natural gas was too nascent an industry to generate
much concern about federal regulation, and the oil industry,
with its history of concentration, was expanding into foreign
markets and was showing signs of greater industrial concentration. For Clark, the country did not witness industrial selfgovernance and government cooperation. Instead, the country
saw intra- and inter-industry conflict, increasing concentration,
and government favoritism toward larger energy firms.
2. 1920-1933
The Roaring Twenties were important years for energy regulation. Most significantly, coal reached the end of its prominence as the nation's energy supplier yielding its position to oil.
This shift did not come without stark socio-economic difficulties
most notably suffered by coal miners. Mine operators, naturally,
were interested in maintaining their market shares. However,

Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982) amended by Pub. L.
No. 100-42, 100 Stat. 310 (May 21, 1987). See also, W. HOGAN, Patternsof Energy Use
Revisited (1988).
"zCLARK, supra note 2, at 107.
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since the coal market was shrinking, the most logical way for
the industry to maintain profitability was to reduce wages. With
the industry in decline due to excess capacity and reduced demand, there was cutthroat competition and pressure for wage
reduction followed by miners' strikes.
In this climate, the National Coal Association, the United
Mine Workers' Association, and government officials petitioned
President Wilson for the establishment of a comprehensive independent coal agency for help.4 3 Wilson did not accept this
plea. But what was government to do, prop up a sagging industry? Exactly! Seemingly out of concern for striking miners and
for an industry with excess capacity, the government reinstituted
an uneven set of wartime price controls with the intent and the
effect of raising coal prices to consumers." Although a fullpowered independent coal commission was not created, a study
commission, the U.S. Coal Commission, was. Not surprisingly,
this study commission found an industry in trouble and "declared that public health and safety depended upon an unfailing
supply of coal, thus attributing to the industry a significance

equal to the railroads and utilities

. . . .

4

The clarion call of

the public interest was being blown by industry itself.
Coal's shrinking market and consumers' growing preference
for oil and natural gas 46 underscored the significance of fuel
substitution. In other words, interindustry competition had focused government regulators' attention on oil production.
The oil industry, which today accounts for about 500 of
the domestic energy market, has been built on two recurrent
themes. First, that reserves are dwindling. 4 7 Second, that oil is
necessary for the nation's security. 48 These themes are brought
together by the fact that since 1915 the country has consumed
49
more oil than it has produced.

, Id. at 111.
Id. at 118.
" Id.

at 137.

- Id. at 144, Table 11.
"

Id.

at 147.

See, e.g., W. HOGAN Energy Security Revisited (1987); United States Department
of Energy, Energy Security: A Report to the President of The United States DOE/S0057 (March, 1987); National Oil Security Policy, Hearing Before the Sub. Comm. on
Energy Regulation and Conservation, Sen. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, §
311-53, 100-1, 100th Cong; 1st Sess. (June 2, 1987).
,9 CLaK, supra note 2, at 146.
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Oil, like natural gas and water, is a fugacious resource which
simply means that it migrates and does not stay in one place.
In order to encourage the development of this resource, the
common law developed the rule of capture-oil belongs to the
person who captures it.s ° The rule of capture promotes production. The downside of the rule is waste. Producers will capture
as much as they can before their neighbors do. If the so-called
free market produces waste, then regulation was in order as
states attempted to regulate the abuses in the oil and gas fields."
Clark correctly notes that the first sets of state oil and gas
conservation statutes were not successful, thus provoking federal
action.
The Federal Oil Conservation Board (FOCB) was instituted
to look into the perceived weakness of the oil industry: waste,
declining reserve estimates, and price instability due in part to
the occasional flush field. Instead of curbing production, the
FOCB responded by promoting the oil depletion allowance and
by opening up the public domain under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920. Both responses favored industry. The FOCB was motivated by the claims of national security and the problems
attendant with overproduction and attempted to increase energy
efficiency through end-use controls such as discouraging inefficient end-uses. In Clark's view, the FOCB did not succeed in
avoiding waste or in smoothly planning for the transition to oil
because it lacked an identity with the public interest. To him
that the FOCB was "an agency of two national administrations
thoroughly attached to laissez-faire doctrines," suggested that
the free market place could not always be trusted to make
52
choices consonant with the public interest.
Clark tries to see something that may not be there. He likes
the idea that the FOCB was a regulatory agency prepared to
intervene in private industry during the politically conservative
Hoover and Coolidge administrations. Yet it pressed for government controls in order to stop waste and stabilize prices as a
form of oil industry protectionism. By controlling production,
that is by reducing the amount of oil on the market, large firms

50

See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERs, Cases and Materials on the Law

of Oil and Gas, 57, n.7 (3rd ed. 1974).
11 See generally N. ELY, The Oil and Gas Conservation Statutes (Annotated)

(1933).
52

CLARK, supra note 2, at 159.
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capture economic rents and oil regulations stabilize prices all to
the great benefit of major oil companies. The FOCB may be
perceived as a public interest agency only if one aligns the
interests of the majors with those of the public.
The 1920's saw the transition from coal to oil through the
tragedy of the commons. Waste was reduced by propping up
prices. This was also a period of real and apparent crises in the
oil and coal industries. In coal, the apparent crisis was an
unworkable transportation system which caused shortages. The
real crisis was labor. In oil, the apparent crisis was a threat to
national security and declining reserve estimates. The real crisis
was a dislocation between supply and demand due to flush fields.
Clearly perceiving these crises required regulators to compare
the two industries and when they did, they became increasingly
aware of interfuel competition. That comparison was never made
by federal regulators and, if made, no action was taken to
coordinate production and consumption of these fuels at a national, comprehensive level.
By the end of the decade, the dominant energy industries
were well entrenched. Energy markets, with the exception of
coal, were expanding; interfuel competition was increasing; and,
so was concentration. By 1929, the split in the oil industry
between the majors and the independents was deep. Twenty-one
majors controlled 6007o of oil production, 10 firms controlled
60076 of the refining and 14 firms controlled 70% of the pipelines. In the natural gas industry, eight holding companies controlled 85% of production. Similarly, 22 electricity holding
companies generated 61 % of the country's electricity. The coal
industry was less concentrated. Seventeen bituminous companies
controlled only 20% of the mines but eight anthracite companies
controlled 7007o of the mines.5 3 In the coal industry, the major
problem was not concentration, it was survival. In the coal
industry the primary conflict was not between major and independent firms, it was between labor and capital.
The 1930's brought with them a peculiar test of the nation's
energy policies. Not only did the country experience a national
economic depression which put a downward pressure on prices,
but rich oil fields were discovered in the oil producing states
most notably in East Texas. Oil prices dropped to below $.10

11Id.

at 184-85.
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per barrel and the majors pushed for firm production controls
to keep prices up. In addition, global oil markets were developing and the east coast refiners could buy cheap foreign oil.
Here again, the majors sought government intervention in the
form of import tariffs to protect their markets.
The flush fields cried out for regulation and the states responded with legislation prohibiting waste and controlling production through such things as well-spacing, unitization,
prorationing, and ratable take regulations. Clark's assessment of
state regulation is that they "proved useless" and that the "hope
for voluntary agreements among producers survived only in the
heart of believers in magic. '' 4 Similarly, interstate compacts
failed because they depended on voluntarism. Clark firmly, and
correctly, believes that the industry would not and could not
reform itself to prevent wasteful production. "Not even five cent
oil induced cooperation.""
If the market does not work, and regulation is sought to
correct market imperfections, then at this point the public interest may well have a place in policy-making. As Clark writes,
"To discover the public interest in the maze of individual, state
and national interests is not an easy task." '5 6 The obvious candidate for the public interest was to halt wasteful production
practices. However, it was not all that clear exactly what this
actually meant. Clark defines waste as "production in excess of
market demand.1 5 7 However, this is a political, not an economic,
definition:
To design an oil policy in conformity with the public interest
required the acceptance of some estimate of recoverable oil
reserves. If a pessimistic estimate was adopted, conservation
appeared as a urgent requirement, and the use of foreign oil
made sense. If optimism prevailed, conservation by whatever
methods seemed less urgent than short-term stabilization. 8
Federal efforts tended to take the pessimistic view by promoting
conservation, thereby further entrenching the majors because it
was in their long-term interest, more than it was for the inde-

Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.
'6 Id. at 217.
'5

57

Id.

11CLARK, supra note

2, at 217-18.
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pendents, to support prices. The independents were just too
shortsighted preferring "to produce 10,000 barrels daily over a
few months even at 25 cents a barrel rather than 300 daily at
$1.00 over several years." 9
On the eve of the New Deal, the nation's energy industries
and markets and their regulation had developed a pattern which
continues to dominate energy planning. Oil replaced coal as the
dominant fuel and large, integrated domestic firms continued to
prosper. The New Deal did little to change this pattern with the
notable exception of federalizing the regulatory structure. Federalization predominantly came in the form of the regulation of
interstate energy sales. 6° Federalization was less an alternative
form of energy planning than it was an adaptation to the nationalization of energy markets. The objective of promoting the
hard path had not changed even though an economic crisis
threatened the country.
3.

The New Deal and World War II

New Deal publicity made much of the National Recovery
Administration and its codes. As it turned out, the codes were
patterned on and ultimately administered by the industry6' and
were held unconstitutional. 62 Federal oil policies designed to
regulate production through the Connolly Hot Oil Act, interstate
compacts, and Harold Ickes' Petroleum Allocation Board and
his Plan and Coordination Committee failed as new oil production flooded the market in 1937-38. Still, big oil was the big
winner of New Deal regulation. In 1937, 20 companies controlled
63
70% of the proven reserves and 76°0 of the refining capacity.
In 1941, the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC)
reported the findings of its investigation of the oil industry and
concluded that the "major integrated oil companies markedly
increased their pre-depression control of reserves and crude pro-

" Id. at 217, quoting H. LARSON AND K. PORTER, History of Humble Oil and
Refining Co.: A Study of Industrial Growth 454 (1959).
11 See The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq. (1982); The Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792 et seq. (1982).
11See generally K. DAvis, FDR - The New Deal Years 1933-1937." A History
(1986).
62 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
63 CLARK, supra note 2, at 249.
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duction and maintained a great supremacy in refining capacity,
refining output, pipeline ownership, and marketing."64
Coal's troubles continued during the New Deal. The bituminous industry was plagued with productive overcapacity, underemployment of miners, poor working conditions, and chaotic
pricing. Instead of recognizing and accepting the declining fortunes of the coal industry, New Deal coal policies "treated
symptoms rather than the illness ' 65 and attempted to increase
wages and promote job security rather than acknowledge the
shifting fuel mix. The result was a labor-sensitive coal policy
which could not address the real need to reduce production to
reflect market demand. The coal codes, like the oil codes before
them, were administered by the industry in the fields and not
centralized in Washington. New Deal coal policies concentrated
on labor problems while ignoring the essential capital problems
facing the industry. In a declining coal industry, government
could not keep mines open and increase miners' wages, although
this is exactly what New Deal laws tried to do. 6 The government
might just pull the impossible off if it could coordinate prices
to the satisfaction of mine operators and mine workers and
consumers. To this end, two National Bituminous Coal Commissions were created to promulgate minimum prices and enforce
codes of unfair trade practices.
Coal actually improved its position slightly during the war.
Production increased and, more importantly, coal found the
market that would serve as its largest customers until the present
day-electric utilities. While utility consumption of coal did not
completely offset coal losses in the railroad, commercial, and
residential sectors, electric utilities kept a market open for coal.
After the war, coal's recurrent ills-poor labor-management relations, deteriorating working conditions, resistance to federal
regulation, competitive producers, and government reluctance to
price-fix-continued to threaten the industry. 67
Clark concludes that the balancing effort failed and that
neither legislation nor industrial "self-governance" worked because coal prices in a market with sectional differences, thousands of producers, and tens of thousands of types of coal

61

6

6,

Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 379.

1989-90]

FossIL FUEL POLICIES

yielding hundreds of thousands of prices made price coordination impossible. He further asserts that coal regulation misperceived the public interest because of its myopia. "The urgent
need, for the industry and for the public interest, was to assure
that coal contributed efficiently to the nation's fuel requirements, an unapproachable goal under NRA or any other system
that managed each fuel in isolation from other fuels." ' 6 Clark's
perception of the public interest here is awkward. It makes
neither short-term economic sense, nor long-term political sense
to erect artificial supports for a declining industry. This is not
to say that miners should not be protected. Rather, price supports are not the way to protect labor.
If the New Deal was not up to the challenge of coordinating
energy policy in the 1930's, would World War II stimulate such
a movement? Not really. The basic regulatory agencies were
divided between oil and coal, e.g., the Petroleum Administration
for War and the Solid Fuels Administration for War. These
agencies continued the old pattern mirrored and were guided by
the industries themselves. Obviously, energy resources, particularly oil, needed to be mobilized, and like the Great War, energy
policies were greatly influenced by the industries themselves.
Worse, industrial concentration continued and war policies favored the larger firms 69 as major oil companies received the bulk

of federal largess being dispensed to build $1 billion of new
70
Of
refineries. "The big bucks flowed to the big companies."

that $1 billion, $805 million went to 18 majors 7' further increasing oil industry concentration.

72

Clark's narrative of federal fossil fuel policies from 1900-46
is a Brandeisian story of corporate concentration. Clark sees
federal policies based on a "pervasive faith in the inherent
economies of bigness achievable through the application of giant
technology to industry. Only rarely does one encounter any
questioning of the link between bigness and efficiency." 7 a This
faith in bigness is uncongenial to Clark because it ignores the
public interest.

Id. at 269.
CLARK, supra note 2, at 312.
1o Id. at 331.
"

'9

11 Id. at 331-32.
72 Id, at 333 and 347.
11 Id. at 382.
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IDEOLOGY: CLARK'S SEARCH FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Clark looks for but does not find the "public interest" in
federal energy regulation and he concludes that energy regulation
is interest-dominated not ideologically motivated.7 4 I believe that
he is wrong on this count as I will explain more fully in the last
section.
Clark's failure to see the ideological underpinnings of federal
energy regulation is a result of his unwillingness to admit that
the "public interest" may be quite comfortable with the country's long prevailing energy policy rather than with his specific
conception of the public interest. Clark adopts a peculiar, modern vision of the public interest in energy policy, developed most
forcefully by Amory Lovins,'7 that closely coordinates energy
production with end use (p. 158):
At no time during the years covered in this study did the
federal government evolve a comprehensive energy policy; instead, policies emerged that deal with each fuel individually.
to transcend a fuel-by-fuel apAlthough there were efforts
76
proach, they bore no fruit.
Was there a public interest dimension in energy regulation?
Citing a 1927 speech of Senator William Borah, Clark notes the
possibility of such a role for federal energy regulation-Borah
argued:
[Gjovernment must carve out an active role in the oil, coal,
and power spheres. Great economic empires exploited those
sources of energy. Known waste accompanied production. Ag-

74 Many analysts of energy policy perceive energy policy formation as ideological.
See J. KALT, The Economics and Politics of Oil Price Regulation: Federal Policy in the
Post-Embargo Era ch. 6 (1981)("Also important, however, is the finding that some form
of ideological, public-interested behavior, which cannot be explained entirely by petroleum-related economic interests of constituencies, has also played an important role in
Senate voting and policy formation." Id. at 238); Mitchell, The Basis of Congressional
Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REV. 591 (1979)(the dominant role of ideology in energy
policy formation); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 279 (1984)(analysis of U.S. Senate voting on coal stripmining regulations); Danielsen & Rubin, An Empirical Investigation of Voting on Energy
Issues, 31 PUB. CHOICES 121 (1977)(examination of Congressional voting on bills relating
to the decontrol of crude oil prices); Bernstein & Horn, Explaining House Voting on
Energy Policy: Ideology and the Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic
Interests, 34 W. POL. Q. 235 (1981)(same).
71A. LovINs, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (1977).
76CLARK, supra note 2, at 28.
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grandized corporate units made unilateral decisions that seriously affected the lives of millions. Many of those decisions
'morally wrong.' 'What,'
were econmically unsound and thus
77
he asked, 'is the public welfare?'
The question intrigues Clark as much as it did Borah and
both would have preferred federal regulators to treat energy
industries like turn-of-the-century public utilities. Firms would
produce energy in the public interest and the federal government
would regulate prices and supplies. Federal energy policy would
be comprehensive and interrelated; favor planning and conservation; and promote efficiency while fighting monopolies.78
It also appears that Clark had another policy objective in
mind in which wealth is redistributed from producers to consumers as a matter of course. In contrast to the dominant energy
policy, an example of a redistributive regulatory scheme would
be environmental regulations which are based on the concept of
externalities. 79 Regulation of externalities shifts the cost of using
public goods from society to producers, and in this way environmental regulation is intentionally redistributive. Energy regulations, to the extent that they shift wealth, do so generally
among industries rather than from producers to consumers.80
Federal regulation comes closest to Clark's brand of the
public interest when an energy industry attains market power.
The federal government's vision of the public interest lies in
market-based efficiency, not in the redistribution of wealth from
producers to consumers. The only redistribution that can be
identified is a redistribution among and within industries and,
most frequently, the redistribution goes in the direction of greater
concentration. Government will intervene when concentration
reaches unacceptable levels, such as when an industry is suscep-

Id. at 165.
7'Id. at 249-50.
See F. ANDERSON, Environmental Improvement Through Economic Incentives
(1977); W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, The Theory of Environmental Policy: Externalities,
Public Outlays, and the Quality of Life (1975); J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, The Economics
of Natural Environments (1975).
w See The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93913 (1974) replaced by the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 83018484 (1962) as amended in Pub. L. No. 100-42, 100 Stat. 310 (May 21, 1987) which
intended to switch resources from the oil industry to the coal industry.
"
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tible to natural monopoly8' or is exercising monopoly power. 2
Such intervention taps into antitrust populism83 which captured

policymakers at the turn of the century but it is not so redistributive as to reorganize energy industries in radical ways.
Why is it so difficult for Clark to find and articulate the
public interest in federal energy regulation? The easy answer is
that even the New Deal was not about to embrace centralized
planning:
[T]he New Deal's elliptical orbit around the central notion of
a planned economy brought it tantalizingly close at one moment while carrying it frustratingly distant the next. Had the
New Deal been more unflinchingly ideological, it would not
have been American; had it been somewhat less flexible and
less the handmaiden of expediency, it might have been more
successful. As it was, its energy policies, hovering somewhere
between pragmatism and opportunism, were burdened from
the start by the insistence of their authors that they satisfy the
interests of all parties-producers, processors,
distributors,
8 4
transporters, employees and consumers.

Notice that even consumers do not escape Clark's criticism.
Consumers expected cheap, convenient, and abundant resources.
And, these demands conflict with the public interest because
they are "not always concordant with such goals as conservation,
end-use efficiency, or coal and oil industry stabilization. "' ' Still
it is hard to understand Clark's criticism of a regulatory system
in which markets are stabilized and consumers have available
adequate, low-cost supplies. Clark says that consumers' desires
6
were not always consistent with healthy energy industries.
He favors the pro-planning position taken by the National
Resources Committee:
To protect the general welfare in our time-in an industralized
and urban economy-means above all to build and maintain

' See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)-(c) (1982)(regulation of interstate
transportation of natural gas is in the public interest because pipelines have monopoly
power). Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § S24(a)-(c) (1982)(similar rationale for regulation
of interstate sales of wholesale electricity). "The protection of the free market economy
from the evils of monopoly defined the objectives of this activity (p. 38)."
" Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1922).
'
CLARK, supra note 2, at 183-90.
Id. at 284-85.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 186.
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in good order a sound economic structure. In an industrialized
resources constitute the foundation stones
civilization the energy
87
of that structure.
The NRC favored comprehensive and coordinated energy (economic) planning and Clark rhetorically asks who could oppose
such a thesis? The answer is-everyone. "At every step the few
advocates of total energy planning that the New Deal harbored
were obstructed by powerful energy-industry and consumer and
public coalitions.""8 Clark prefers a planned energy economy
even though neither consumers nor producers share his preference.
III.

IMAGINATION: THE FAILURE OF A NATIONAL ENERGY

POLICY
Clark sees a failure of imagination, and I take it, an afortiori
failure of will, in federal energy policy-making to embark in
centralized energy planning. But Clark's energy path runs counter
to the country's political economy.
Energy and the Federal Government wrestles with the interaction of interests and ideology while trying to locate the public
interest in the mixture. To Clark, the dominance of interests
over ideology prevented the country's energy imagination from
formulating a truly alternative regulatory scheme:
The properties of energy resources, their geographic location,
the processing required to change them into marketable commodities, the transportation employed to haul them to consumers, user preferences for a particular quality of energy to
perform a specific task-all of these were interrelated facets
of a national energy system but fragmented political responses,
which seemed incapable of comprehending the essentially holistic character of the system.8 9
Clark's heuristic confuses the study of energy policy by treating
interests and ideology separately. By treating interests and ideology as mutually exclusive, Clark stumbles over, but fails to
see, the prevailing ideology. The ideology of domestic energy

11 Id. at 284 (quoting NRC, Energy Resources and National Policy, Report of the
Energy Resources Committee to the U.S. National Resources Committee 36 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1939).
CLARK, supra note 2, at 292.
Id. at 182.

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:115

planning is to promote competition among several energy interests. Ideology incorporates interests, including the public interest, it does not separate them. Economic efficiency, economic
growth, economies of scale, and a cautious eye on market power
delimit the public interest.
The simple explanation for the country's failure to develop
comprehensive energy planning early in the century is that Clark's
"holistic" picture is anachronistic. During the period under study,
federal regulators infrequently thought in terms of "energy"
regulation. Instead, they regulated "fuels." This approach allowed "conflicting interest within and among the fuel industries"
as an "abundance of energy precluded the formation of more
than random, crisis-oriented, superficial policies." 9
Occasional federal studies, such as those from TNEC, together with those from the National Resources Committee (NRC)
and two National Bituminous Coal Commissions, envisioned a
regulatory regime in which centralized energy planning was in
the public interest. Clark saw in these efforts the possibility of
a truly imaginative energy plan based upon the interrelatedness
of energy industries, the usefulness of centralized administration,
and the need for end-use and interindustry coordination in the
public interest.
In defining the energy industries as public utilities, in grappling
with prevalent manifestations of the public interest which emphasized abundant supply at cheap prices as almost a national
birth right, in searching for ways to assure efficiency and
economy in energy use, TNEC-NRC assumed a position along
the leading edge in energy affairs. 9'
Such a statement clearly begs the question, then why has energy
planning been such a failure?
The more complex answer is that our political economy
resists a significant amount of planning because regulated competition is more efficient.
Ironically, Energy and the Federal Government offers a penetrating insight into why the country never has had a coherent

o Id. at 183.
9, Id. at 250.
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and coordinated national energy plan 92 by chronicling the history
and development of the country's dominant energy ideology.
History shows that energy policies respond to market activities
not the other way around. With the exceptions of monopoly
power, severe shortages, or gross surpluses, price regulation is

disastrous and price-setting is better left to the market, not to a
planned economy, wherein lies the public interest.
The country's energy policy is generated by the images of
the great dynamos at the great turn of the century expositions
mentioned at the beginning of this Essay. Large energy machines
promised prosperity, therefore larger energy machines (and energy firms) promised even more prosperity. The public interest

was folded into a richly textured ideological mix, also known as
pluralism, in which energy production and economic growth
were thoroughly integrated. Put less prosaically, 20th century
energy policy is based on the belief, perhaps not irrational, that
centralized, large-scale, high-technology private energy firms are
good for America-Amory Lovins notwithstanding. 93
Clark exposes the interaction among interest, ideology, and
imagination but he does not fully explain their relationship. He
writes that "Ideology served as a convenient mask in the pursuit

92

See generally J. CHUaB,

Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of

Energy, chs. 1 and 7 (1983)(the United States has no single energy plan; instead, it has
a series of plans which pertain to individual energy industries such as oil, natural gas,
coal, and nuclear power). See also B. COMMONER, The Politics of Energy (1979); D.
DAvIs, Energy Politics (1974); Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose (1974); W. ROSENBAUM, Energy, Politics, and Public Policy (1981); R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN (EDS.),
Energy Future (1979); and, Tomain, InstitutionalizedConflicts Between Law and Policy,
22 HOUSTON L. REV. 661 (1985). I maintain that there still is no comprehensive energy
policy even though the president, through the Department of Energy, submits a biennial
"Natural Energy Policy Plan" to the Congress as per the Department of Energy
Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7321-7375 (1982).
91 A. LovINs, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (1977). The reference
in the text to centralized large-scale, high-technology energy producers is an intentional
reference to the so-called hard-path. To dichotomize Lovins' analysis into hard-path and
soft-path without more elaboration is to do an injustice to Lovins' seminal work. Soft
Energy Paths describes an energy transition from conventional to renewable and more
energy efficient use of natural resources. For Lovins, the energy transition can occur
without sacrificing "life style" or "quality of life." This transition can develop, according to Lovins, when energy planners key energy policies to end-use needs. Lovins' most
memorable example of a mismatch between energy production and end use is using
nuclear generated electric power to boil water. He says that such a use is "like cutting
butter with a chain saw." Id. at 40. Clark is aware of this example. He too argues that
planners should coordinate production and end use: "we would serve ourselves well by
scrutinizing the energy diseconomies implicit in boiling lima beans on an electric stove."
CLARK, supra note 2, at 390.
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of special benefits" and "That search for the public interest in
fuels . . . came to naught, lost in the quagmire of contending
special interests unable to recruit a supportive public. ' ' 9 But
isn't this exactly the point? In American politics, pluralism and
interest politics constitute our ideology. Interest and ideology
are not antinomies they are embedded one inside the other. The
public interest can only be defined in this context. If the public
is quiescent about energy prices, then policymakers can assume
that the prices are tolerable. The public will tolerate some shortterm industry profit taking as long as energy supplies are reliable
and relatively cheap. However, the public will not tolerate longterm profit taking (monopoly), price shocks, or supply shortages
and government should intervene in such circumstances.
For Clark, ideology does not provide an adequate explanation for federal energy policy-making:
Ideological stances rarely explain satisfactorily the political
course pursued by these protagonists. Ideological rhetoric served
to guard against the entrance of various interests into the
political arena in search of concrete advantages or to counter
specific threats. Awesome complexity characterized the seamless web of America's ongoing energy transition. New technologies, improved performance of established technologies,
demographic changes (particularly in metropolitan areas), consumer preferences shaped in part by increasingly subtle advertising and whetted by inviting new financing programs,
proximity to a power line or a pipeline, all of these variables
and more explain the nation's fuel mix. Among the variables,
it may be that policy or its absence contributed one iota to a
decision to use a particular fuel or energy source. 95
Clark does not give his analysis enough credit. Undeniably,
energy industries and regulations are complex. Nevertheless, the
country's energy story has been consistent for a century. The
story can be simply told as a transition from coal to oil ending
in a fuel mix that is almost evenly split between oil and electricity
with suppliers that have easily identifiable characteristics.
COUNTER-THESIS: INTEREST, IDEOLOGY, AND IMAGINATION

IV.

REDEFINED
Clark's analytic mistake is treating interests and ideology
separately and then relying on this separation as a justification
CLARK, supra note 2, at 384.
91 Id. at 169.
'"
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for saying that the "public interest" is absent from energy
regulation. This separation seems to be a common mistake.
Conservative "public choice" theorists 96 and liberal pluralist
political philosophers 7 both extol a similar virtue in American
politics. Each branch of contemporary political philosophy claims
that American politics is dominated by interests not ideology.
Clark follows this formula. This claim traces its heritage backwards through a venerable history98 at least to de Tocqueville 99
and certainly can be located in the writings of at least one of
the Founders. t°° With so much history, the concept that American politics is dominated by interests rather than ideology has
become a catechism, an article of faith, an operating assumption
and, therefore, a truism that may be foolish to refute but is
more foolish not to question.
This truism has the effect of positioning political debate.
Ideology is separated from interest and theorists of different
political stripes then do battle over the meaning, definition, and
role of interest. For the Right, "interest" means individual selfinterest. For the Left, "interest" means, individual self-interest,
group interest, and, occasionally, "public interest." 10' "Public
interest" is put in quotation marks because it is not clear exactly
what public interest means. Traditionally, it entails a certain
amount of altruism either in the form of classic civic virtue or
the new republicanism.

01 2

Once interests have been identified, no matter how roughly,
they then become signals for broader ideological positions. In-

9 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, The Calculus of Consent, Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); D. MUELLER, Public Choice (1979);
M. OLSON, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(1965).
See, e.g., R. DAH., A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); J. DIGGINS, The
Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest and the Foundationsof Liberalism
(1984); L. HARTZ, Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretationof American Political
Thought Since the Revolution (1955); R. HOFSTADTER, The American PoliticalTradition
(1948); S. HUNTINGTON, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1981).
" D. TRUMAN, The Governmental Process: PoliticalInterests and Public Opinion
(2d ed. 1971).
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America (1898 2d).

10THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
101Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PUB.
102
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80 (1987).

See, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE

L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985, Term Forward: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New
Deal, 101 HARv. L. RaV. 421 (1987).
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deed, it is precisely at this point-the point at which background
assumptions underlying labels and definitions-that ideology
moves from the background into the foreground. Also, it is at
this point at which interests and ideology in American politics
are interrelated not separated.
Interest without ideology is acontextual, uncentered, and
non-existent. It is the specific virtue of the American political
enterprise that ideology is contextual and background and, therefore, ever present. Its presence is manifest by several attributes,
most notably that decision making and policymaking processes
must satisfy due process and equal protection concerns. Government decisions then attain legitimacy and public acceptability
only when they are within the perimeters of acceptable American
ideological discourse. I believe that John Clark would not disagree with this hypothesis, and I further believe that his book is
an excellent story of interests played out against an ideological
background, not separate from it.
The ideology of energy regulation is muted corporatism.
While the federal government did not promote energy industries
in the first half of the 20th Century as actively as it promoted
the railroad industry in the 19th and the commercial nuclear
industry later in the century, energy industries were not left to
the unpredictability of free market forces. Instead, favored industries were protected and, as Clark writes, "'Laissez-faire'
thinking may have clouded the minds of theoreticians, not industrialists. ' ' t° Coal and oil were the main beneficiaries of government protection through regulatory schemes which supported
coal prices when that industry was on the decline and employed
production controls and depletion allowances to "stabilize" oil
prices.
Clark begins his concluding chapter by stating: "Federal
policies toward the mineral fuels from 1900 to 1946 can be
characterized as unsystematic, vague, and eminently minimal." ,04
I am not at all certain that his deeply detailed study supports
his conclusion. Rather, I think that Clark has uncovered systematic federal efforts to promote a peculiar energy policy. Clark
bemoans the lack of a more centralized, planned national energy
policy. He argues that neither exogenous events (two world wars
and an economic depression) nor endogenous events (interfuel
'03 CLARK, supra note 2, at 168.

1o Id. at 381.
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competition and fuel mix transition) were enough to catapult
the country into formulating such a comprehensive plan. Clark
sees this as a sign of weakness. In fact, the opposite may just
as well be the case.
The United States has an identifiable energy policy which is
thoroughly coordinated with its fundamental political economy-democratic capitalism. Faith in bigness and technology,
that is faith that energy industries can realize economies of scale
and reduce or keep energy prices low is central to our national
energy policy. Generally, the public interest is not antagonistic
to this dominant policy as it keeps alive its faith in an energyGNP link. Belief in energy production and economic growth
was the article of faith upon which both the secular religion of
energy regulation and the cathedral-like dynamos were built. It
may very well be that there is no direct ratio between economic
growth and energy production, but after a century of evidence
to the contrary, the burden to refute this article of faith rests
on those who dare speak heresy. Regulations were employed
which kept energy industries healthy as monopoly was the only
sin needing expiation.
Building on the assumption that there is a positive correlation
between energy use and economic growth' 05 (the energy-GNP
link),' 0 6 the resulting energy policy has the following general
goals:
07
(1) to assure abundant supplies;'
(2) to maintain reasonable prices;' 0 8

OSSee, e.g., BERNDT & WOOD, Energy Price Shocks and Productivity Growth: A

Survey in R. GORDON, H. JACOBY & M. ZImERMAN, Energy: Markets and RegulationEssays in Honor of M. A. Adelman, 305 (R. Gordon ed. 1987); S. SCHUmR ET ALS.,
Energy in America's Future: The Choices Before Us, ch. 3 (1979); see also G. BARNEY,
The Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S. (1980); J. SIMON & H. KAHN, The
Resourceful Earth (1980). But see LOVINS supra note 75 at 7-11.
,0 The statement that there is an energy-GNP link is not meant to encompass the
further inference that greater economic productivity and more energy production necessarily means an improvement in general welfare. Bigger may be better, however, that
is a normative claim that I am not prepared to make here, let alone defend. The energyGNP link is intended as a positive not a normative assertion.
107 Today, a healthy availability of energy resources means that the lights go on
when the switch is flipped; the car starts when the key is turned; and, the air conditioning
works. See STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 92 at 144-48.
,01A corollary of the energy-GNP link is stability in energy prices. As long as the
real price of energy is stable, then productivity is stable because a larger portion of
income is not expended on energy. Energy prices have been stable since the beginning

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:115

(3) to limit the market power of the archetype firms;1°9
(4) to promote inter- and intrafuel competition;110
(5) to support a limited number of conventional fuels (oil,
natural gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power);' " and,
(6) to allow energy decisionmaking and policy-making to
develop within an active federal-state regulatory system.

Clark favors the NRC's gospel of the "interrelatedness of
all fuels and the nonrenewability of conventional sources of
energy" because "It transcended the habitual fuel-by-fuel approach by offering a holistic view of energy" and because its
position was "rooted in a responsible notion of the public interest and the imperative of national security.""' 2 However, the

NRC dream never materialized. Clark, therefore, concludes that
"Only with difficulty and charity can one identify success in the
checkered history of federal fuel policies.""' Curiously, he goes
on to say that fuel policies by the end of World War II "had

of the century with the exception of the decade approximately between 1973-1983. See
U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1957 (1960)(see series G 244-330 and 353-426); U.S. Department of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984 (1983)(Table 985); Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1987 (1986)(Table 941); and, Energy Information Agency, Annual
Energy Review 1987 DOE/EIA-0384 (87) (May, 1988)(Table 22).
I') "Market power" can be defined in several ways: "[T]he ability of a firm (or a
group of firms, acting jointly) to raise prices above the competitive level without losing
so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded."
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 937 (1981); see
also Comments, Landes and Posner On Market Power: Four Responses, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1787-1874 (1982); "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude
competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956); "[Tlhe abilities of firms to influence the prices of their products either through
independent actions or through actions coordinated with others." W. BALDWIN, Market
Power, Competition, and Antitrust Policy, 3 (1987).Today, market power is threatened
by natural gas pipelines and electric transmission facilities. See Pierce, A Proposal to
Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986) (electricity transmission retail market power); Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from
Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L. J. 1, 16-18 (1988)(natural gas transmission retains
market power).
11 See generally, CLARK, supra note 2 and VIETOR, supra note 12.
" Most of the fuels produced and consumed domestically consist of fossil fuels
like coal, natural gas, and oil. The fossil fuels are either used directly or used in the
production of electricity. Nuclear power and hydropower supplement the fossil fuels in
the production of electricity. "Alternative fuels," such as solar, wind, geothermal or
even synthetic fuels such as oil shale, do not play a major role in the country's energy
picture as the following figures demonstrate. See statistics supra note 13.
H2 CLARK, supra note 2, at 389.
1.3
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yet to metamorphose into an 'energy concept'." '"1 4 He is right,
the metamorphosis he wants has not taken place. But so what?
He bemoans the fact that the country has not followed the NRC
path and he adopts a pessimistic diagnosis as a result of their
lack of foresight.
Indeed, Clark adopts a Limits to Growth"5 mentality in the
three concluding and disappointing paragraphs of his book. His
litany of doom begins with the Arab Oil Embargo and the
country's failure to deal comprehensively with end-use needs.
This is tragic for Clark because as the United States enters an
"age of economic decline at home and with only the tattered
remnants of power; surviving overseas, we would serve ourselves
well by scrutinizing the energy diseconomies implicit in boiling
lima beans on an electric stove." 1" 6 Clark's analysis undercuts
his own conclusion. Why the pessimism? Why not argue that a
policy of no centralized central planning has served the country
well through two world wars, the great depression, oil embargoes, and fuel transitions, and that the regulated energy market
works acceptably well.
Clark's last paragraph and last words on the public interest
I found cryptic. He is correct in saying that the phrase is a
rhetorical device and that it has been often used by industry
interests. He goes on, however, to indict the public for their
complacency. "Sadly enough, the failure to discover the public
interest in fuels stemmed from the self-delusion of the general
public, narcotized by the wildly optimistic pronouncements of
federal and private-sector information mongers that we were
secure in our supply of cheap energy. Succumbing to such skyis-the-limit prompts, the public foolishly equated its best interests
with cheap energy and absolute freedom of use." 11 7 He closes
by saying, again pessimistically, that it is "too much to expect
the emergence of a new mentality, no matter how dire and
prescient the warnings."' 8 What warnings?
It is unclear to me exactly what Clark is talking about here.
Such unsupported musings appended as they are to his richly

' Id. at 390.
D. MEADOWS ET A&s., The Limits to Growth (1972); MEADOWS, THE LINUTS TO
GROWTH REVISITED, in P. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, The Cassandra Conference: Resources
'

and the Human Predicament 257 (P. Ehrlich ed. 1988).
16 CLARK, supra note 2, at 390. See LOVINS, supra note 75.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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detailed history, go well beyond the scope of his story to no
reliable point. My guess is that he is frustrated by not uncovering
a clear definition of the public interest. Aside from industrial
concentration he has not uncovered an evil empire. He has not
done the cost-benefit analysis of government regulation to support his thesis that more coordinated regulation is somehow
better for the country. Most studies generally indicate that comprehensive regulations cost more than they are worth and that
market ordering is preferable in most instances save those of
identifiable market failures such as externalities or monopolies.
There is no solid evidence that we are running out of energy
resources nor is it clear that the relative cost of energy is escalating rapidly. Rather than centralized energy planning, national
energy policy is made within a complex federal-state-market
process that has endured. 1 9
With the exception of these few criticisms, Clark's book
deserves to be read for the excellent political history that it is.
He has made a significant contribution to our understanding of
federal energy regulations and his Energy and The Federal Government deserves to become the standard in the field.

,,9 Tomain, supra note 92.

